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J.D.B. v. NORTH CAROLINA: AN APPROPRIATE EXPANSION OF
MIRANDA TO ACCOUNT FOR AGE IN JUVENILE
INTERROGATIONS
HANNA MARIE SHEEHAN ∗
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 1 the Supreme Court of the United
States reevaluated the Miranda 2 in-custody test with respect to juvenile
criminal offenders. The Court determined that age must be considered for Miranda purposes when law enforcement officers interrogate
juveniles. 3 The Court appropriately changed the rule with regards to
juvenile offenders based on the cognitive differences between juveniles and adults, mainly relying on the different cognitive processes
and abilities that adults and juveniles employ to comprehend the circumstances surrounding custodial situations. 4 The Supreme Court’s
rule does not completely destroy the previous Miranda rule; rather, it
merely adds the single factor of age, and asks how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would view his ability to end the questioning. 5 The Supreme Court appropriately developed a rule that
comports with a progressive trend of establishing separate, categorical
rules for juveniles. 6 Juveniles should be considered under different
paradigms because of their physical under-development and decreased capacity to evaluate, process, and understand situations where
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1. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.1.
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their rights may be compromised. 7 While the Court intended the rule
from J.D.B. to apply to any instance in which a juvenile is questioned
in a custodial setting, it is possible to apply this rule to another discrete class of individuals: cognitively deficient adults. 8 Due to the similar comprehensive abilities of cognitively deficient adults and juveniles, the rule appropriately could apply to this group of adult
offenders. 9
I. THE CASE
On September 24, 2005, two home break-ins occurred in Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, resulting in the theft of several items including a
camera and jewelry. 10 Later that day, the police stopped and briefly
spoke to J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old seventh grader enrolled in special
education courses, when he was discovered near one of the targeted
residences. 11 After this encounter, the police received information
that J.D.B. had been seen in possession of one of the stolen goods, a
digital camera, and had passed it along to another student at his middle school. 12 With this information, Officer DiCostanzo of the Chapel
Hill Police Department went to J.D.B.’s school to speak with him. 13
After Officer Dicostanzo arrived at the school, a “uniformed school
resource officer” removed J.D.B. from class and escorted him to the
conference room where the door was subsequently shut but not
locked. 14 Three other adults were in the room when J.D.B. arrived
with the school officer: Officer DiCostanzo, the assistant principal,
and an intern. 15
Once the door to the room was shut, Officer DiCostanzo asked
J.D.B. if he would answer questions regarding the recent break-ins. 16
J.D.B. consented and initially denied any involvement in the crimes;
7. See infra Part IV.C.1.
8. See infra Part IV.C.2.
9. See infra Part IV.C.2.
10. In re J.B., No. COA06-662, 2007 WL 1412457, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. May 15, 2007),
aff’d, 674 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S.
Ct. 2394 (2011).
11. Id. at *1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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he admitted, however, that he was in the area when the break-ins occurred. 17 At that point in the questioning, Officer DiCostanzo revealed to J.D.B. that the stolen camera had been recovered. 18 Following this revelation, the assistant principal pressured J.D.B. to “‘do the
right thing’ and tell the truth.” 19 J.D.B. then inquired if he would “be
in trouble” if he gathered and returned the stolen items, to which Officer DiCostanzo replied that it would be beneficial for J.D.B. to return the items but, regardless, “this thing is going to court.” 20 Officer
DiCostanzo then told J.D.B. that he might be able to seek an order to
hold him in juvenile detention until the trial, presumably if he did
not return the stolen items. 21
Next, Officer DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that “he was not under
arrest, that he was free to leave, and that he was not required to speak
about the case.” 22 Following this statement, Officer DiCostanzo asked
J.D.B. if he understood the situation, and J.D.B. nodded his head in
consent. 23 Then J.D.B. explained in detail how he and a friend broke
into the two houses and stole various items. 24 At Officer DiCostanzo’s
request, he provided a written statement of these admissions. 25 After
J.D.B. wrote down the requested statement, the school bell signaling
the end of the day rang, and Officer DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that
“he should leave so that he would not miss his bus.” 26 By the time
J.D.B. left the office, the interview had been going on for approximately “30 to 45 minutes.” 27
On October 19, 2005, the State filed two juvenile petitions
against J.D.B. alleging that he was a delinquent as a result of his

17. Id. He told Officer DiCostanzo that he was in the area “going door-to-door trying
to be hired to do small jobs.” Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Following the conclusion of the interview, Officer DiCostanzo went to J.D.B.’s
residence with another officer, spoke with J.D.B. again, acquired a search warrant for
J.D.B.’s house and went with J.D.B. around the house and the surrounding area in a search
to recover the other stolen items. Id.
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“breaking and entering and larceny.” 28 Prior to the adjudication
hearing, J.D.B. moved to suppress the statements he made in the
school office under the theory that he was in custody during the interrogation and was not afforded the necessary Miranda warnings. 29
The district court ultimately decided that J.D.B. was not in custody
during the interrogation and denied his motion to suppress; the district court did not, however, offer its reasoning why J.D.B. was not in
custody. 30 At the disposition hearing, J.D.B. admitted the allegations
in the petitions but renewed his arguments regarding the motion to
suppress; despite this, based on J.D.B.’s admission, the court adjudicated J.D.B. a delinquent juvenile. 31
On appeal, J.D.B. asked the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
to find that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his
statements to the police. 32 In evaluating the trial court’s decision, the
court of appeals defined the in-custody test as requiring an objective
evaluation of whether, under the “totality of the[] circumstances, a
reasonable person standing in the place of the juvenile would have
believed that he was restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 33 The appellate court ultimately concluded
that the trial court must offer definitive findings of fact necessary to
support its determination that J.D.B. was not in custody at the time of
the interrogation and remanded the case. 34 On remand, the trial
court made “findings of fact [and] conclusions of law” to support the
denial of J.D.B.’s motion to suppress. 35 J.D.B. again appealed. 36
On J.D.B.’s second appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, the court fully evaluated the trial court’s findings of fact as well
as the legal standard. 37 The court ultimately concluded that the trial
court did not commit error with respect to the legal conclusion that

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *5 (quoting In re W.R., 634 S.E.2d 923, 926–27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id.
35. In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795, 797 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C.
2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
36. Id. at 798.
37. Id. at 800–01.
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J.D.B. was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda when Officer
DiCostanzo interrogated him at school. 38 The state appellate court
stated that numerous factors contributed to this determination: J.D.B.
was not locked in the room and therefore maintained his freedom to
leave, he was not constrained, he was not placed under arrest, and Officer DiCostanzo told him that he did not have to answer any of the
questions posed to him. 39 The majority decision also stated that age
by itself does not play a role in determining whether an individual has
been placed in custody for Miranda purposes. 40 The state appellate
court determined that “a reasonable person in J.D.B.’s position would
not have believed himself to be in custody or deprived of his freedom
of action in some significant way” for the purposes of Miranda and affirmed the lower court’s decision. 41
In dissent, Judge Beasley disagreed with the majority’s ruling that
J.D.B. had not been in custody for the purposes of Miranda. 42 Judge
Beasley stated that the court must evaluate “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and . . . the effect those circumstances
would have on a reasonable person.” 43 She then stated she would
consider a juvenile’s age as a factor in the “reasonable person” test
because age may influence the individual’s belief of whether he is in
custody. 44 Judge Beasley would have held that J.D.B. was in custody
because “a uniformed school resource officer” had taken him to the
school office, the door to the office was closed after he entered, and
“four adults were in the room” when Officer DiCostanzo questioned
J.D.B. 45 Primarily, she focused on the facts that after J.D.B. answered
the questions posed to him, he was not released to class, and the of38. Id. at 799–800.
39. Id. at 799.
40. Id. at 800. The majority stated, however, that “an individual’s subnormal mental
capacity and age are factors to be considered when determining whether a knowing and
intelligent waiver of rights has been made.” Id.
41. Id. at 800–01.
42. Id. at 801 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 802 (citing State v. Garcia, 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (N.C. 2004)).
44. Id. Judge Beasley pointed out that “[t]o hold otherwise would lead to the absurd
result that, when required to determine whether a ‘reasonable person in the defendant’s
situation’ would consider himself in custody, courts would apply exactly the same analysis,
regardless of whether the individual was eight or thirty-eight years old.” Id.
45. Id. Judge Beasley made this determination with the knowledge that J.D.B. was neither under extra restraints in the interrogatory situation nor locked in the room. Id. at
803.
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ficer and the assistant principal would not accept the answers he gave
them. 46 Finally, Judge Beasley commented that the pseudo-warning
that Officer DiCostanzo gave J.D.B. after his self-incriminating statements was not enough to admit the statements under the in-custody
analysis because, according to her, J.D.B. was in custody from the
moment he walked into the office; therefore, the post-confession recitation of Miranda warnings was not sufficient. 47
Following the decision of the state appellate court, J.D.B. appealed “as of right” under North Carolina law to the Supreme Court
of North Carolina. 48 Mirroring Judge Beasley’s dissent, J.D.B. argued
that he was in custody when he was questioned and that age should be
considered for Miranda purposes. 49 The state supreme court followed
the same line of reasoning the state appellate court did in determining that J.D.B. was not in custody when Officer DiCostanzo interrogated him. 50 The state supreme court disagreed with Judge Beasley’s
argument that age should be a factor in deciding if a person is in custody; instead, the court found age irrelevant for the in-custody analysis
because a consideration of age was contrary to the “objective ‘reasonable person’” inquiry necessary for Miranda purposes. 51 Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the state appellate court that
J.D.B. was not entitled to the protections of Miranda. 52 Two judges
filed separate dissenting opinions arguing that J.D.B. was in custody
for Miranda purposes. 53 The Supreme Court of the United States
46. Id.
47. Id. at 802–04.
48. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 137 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
49. Id. In North Carolina, an individual may appeal “as of right” to the Supreme Court
of North Carolina “on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals.” Id.
50. Id. at 137–39.
51. Id. at 139–40 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 140.
53. Justices Brady and Hudson disagreed with the majority’s opinion and concluded
that they would have considered J.D.B. in custody for Miranda purposes as a consequence
of both his age and the facts found by the trial court. See id. at 144–46 (Brady, J., dissenting) (discussing age with respect to the reasonable person standard as well as the extra
protections that should be awarded to juveniles as general policy in the legal system); id. at
150 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (discussing the reasonable person in the circumstances standard and how age should be a considered factor because it can inform courts how to view
the circumstances as well as how to use “commonsense” determinations to evaluate issues
regarding behavior and perception). Both dissenters opined that age should be considered as a factor in the in-custody analysis because juvenile constitutional rights must be
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granted certiorari “to determine whether the Miranda custody analysis
includes consideration of a juvenile suspect’s age.” 54
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional rights of
adults being interrogated in custodial situations must be protected. 55
The Court has applied this rule to juvenile defendants as well and has
historically viewed juvenile offenders as a special class of individuals
that needs protection when being questioned. 56 Elaborating on the
protection of individual rights during an interrogation, the Court has
formulated a two-part test that may be applied by law enforcement to
any situation to assess if an individual is in custody. 57 It has also applied this two-part test to situations involving juvenile offenders. 58 In
the past several years, the Supreme Court has carved out categorical
rules for juvenile offenders in certain areas involving criminal sentences, utilizing the same reasoning it applies when carving out exceptions for cognitively deficient adults. 59
A. The Supreme Court Has a History of Protecting the Rights of
Individuals Who Are Being Questioned in Custodial Situations,
Construing Those Rights Based on Evolutions of the Law
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects the evolution of
rights afforded to individuals in custodial situations. The Court definitively stated its position on the need for individuals in custody to be
informed of their constitutional rights in Miranda v. Arizona 60 and
continued to define this right well after that case. 61 Although the
Court ultimately settled on a seemingly objective and general “ordinary reasonable person” standard, specific decisions of the Court pri-

protected and because juveniles may be subject to more outside pressures and coercion
than would adult offenders in similar circumstances. Id. at 145 (Brady, J., dissenting); id.
at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
54. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011).
55. See infra Part II.A.
56. See infra Part II.A.2.
57. See infra Part II.B.
58. See infra Part II.B.
59. See infra Part II.C.
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
61. See infra Part II.A.2.
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or to Miranda depicted that the Court historically considered juveniles
in custodial situations under a different set of standards. 62
1. Prior to the Development of the Miranda Test, the Supreme Court
Determined That the Age of Juvenile Defendants Must Be
Considered for Custody Purposes
Prior to Miranda, when admissions of confessions were challenged, courts conducted an individual analysis to determine whether
a person was in custody at the time of his confession. 63 The federal
courts previously “evaluated the admissibility of a suspect’s confession
under a voluntariness test” rooted in due process; this test still exists
in a limited form today. 64 The due process test required courts to
consider whether under the totality of the circumstances, the individual being questioned offered a voluntary confession or statement to
the police. 65 The test included an analysis of the individual’s subjective mindset concerning the questioning and whether that individual
felt overwhelmed in such a circumstance. 66 Although it is no longer
applied by the courts, this subjective case-by-case due process test suggests that juveniles were regarded differently from adults in the criminal justice system. 67
The subjective test was applied in Haley v. Ohio, 68 which specifically addressed the rights of juveniles. 69 In Haley, a plurality of the Supreme Court determined that, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the confessions of a juvenile, elicited while
the individual was isolated and without the benefit of counsel, were
inadmissible at trial. 70 The police arrested and then questioned a fifteen-year-old boy, in isolation without any “friend or counsel . . . present,” from midnight to 5:00 AM until he “confessed” to murder. 71
62. See infra Part II.A.1.
63. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–34 (2000).
64. Id. at 433–34.
65. Id. at 434.
66. Id.
67. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (1948) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
specific implications of considering the age and status of a juvenile for in-custody purposes).
68. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
69. Id. at 599–601.
70. Id. at 598–99.
71. Id. at 598.
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Further, the defendant only received information regarding his constitutional rights immediately before making a written statement of
his confession but after several hours of interrogation. 72 The plurality
commented on the circumstances under which the juvenile defendant’s questioning occurred and stated that “[w]hat transpired would
make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And
when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is before us,
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.” 73 The plurality
noted that when a juvenile confesses to crimes under such circumstances of isolation and coercion, he may not be subjected to the
same “standards of maturity” and understanding as an adult. 74 Comparing adults and juveniles in such predicaments, the plurality stated,
situations “[t]hat . . . would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.” 75 Ultimately, the
plurality determined that the defendant’s confession was inadmissible
under the specific circumstances. 76
Although Haley did not become the standard for juveniles because the decision did not garner majority support, the plurality’s reasoning offers substantial insight into early decisions that considered
age and treated juveniles differently from adults in the criminal justice system. 77 For example, the plurality made a distinction between
the capacities of juvenile offenders to understand their personal situations when being questioned by the police and the capacity of adult
offenders in the same situation. 78 The plurality also stated that, due
to a variety of factors, juveniles require support and counsel if they are
to avoid the fear and coercion that may accompany official interrogations; they should be permitted access to these resources so they are

72. Id. The statement read as follows:
[T]he law gives you the right to make this statement or not as you see fit. It is
made with the understanding that it may be used at a trial in court either for or
against you or anyone else involved in this crime with you, of your own free will
and accord, you are under no force or duress or compulsion and no promises
are being made to you at this time whatsoever.
Id.
73. Id. at 599.
74. Id. at 599–600.
75. Id. at 599.
76. Id. at 601.
77. Id. at 599–600.
78. Id.
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not overwhelmed by the presence of law enforcement. 79 The plurality
considered a variety of factors to determine whether the defendant’s
statements should be allowed into court including: the defendant’s
age, the hours the questioning took place, the lack of counsel for the
defendant, and the overall attitudes of the police officers toward the
defendant during the interrogation. 80 Finally, the plurality commented that even though the juvenile allegedly received a reading of his
constitutional rights before he validated his written confession, in the
absence of counsel or another source to inform him of his freedom to
decline to answer any questions, it cannot be determined that he appreciated or understood his actual freedom to end the interrogation
or refuse police questioning. 81
2. Miranda Warnings Were Developed as a Means to Protect the
Rights of Individuals Being Questioned by Law Enforcement
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution affords
an individual the right against self-incrimination, 82 a crucial aspect of
an individual’s ability to receive due process within the criminal justice system. The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda analyzed this
Amendment. 83 In Miranda, the Court found that the police must inform an individual of his Fifth Amendment rights prior to questioning when they take him into custody. 84 When advising the individual
of these rights, the police officer must say,
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.” 85
The Court also explained that an individual maintains the ability
to exercise these particular rights throughout the custodial interroga-

79. Id. at 600.
80. Id. at 600–01.
81. Id. at 601.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
83. 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 479.
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tion, 86 but may waive these rights of his own free will. 87 Consequently,
if these rights are knowingly and intelligently waived by an individual
in custody, then any statements acquired from him during the interrogation following the warnings may be admitted into court. 88
In the course of developing Miranda rights, the Court discussed
and analyzed specific policy concerns relating to the protections of
the Fifth Amendment. These concerns included an evaluation of the
potential for corruption or coercion on the part of the police or others. 89 Specifically, such an evaluation may depend on the surrounding circumstances, such as when an individual is incarcerated, isolated
from the general population, or pressured by law enforcement and
then questioned for any length of time. 90 The Court discussed the
importance of allowing individuals to maintain the right against selfincrimination in the specific circumstances surrounding an interrogation because police officers are trained to use techniques to pressure
and persuade the individual to make incriminating statements. 91 Illustrating this concern, the Court commented that “[a]n individual
swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by
antagonistic forces, and subjected to . . . techniques of persuasion . . .
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.” 92 The Court
also commented on its concern that when a person is “isolated” with
the police the “compulsion to speak” and reveal incriminating information may be “greater” than when an individual is surrounded by
“impartial observers,” such as those found in a courtroom setting, who
86. Id. In Miranda, the Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 479.
88. Id. Otherwise, to admit these statements would be a violation of the right against
self-incrimination. Id.
89. Id. at 476–77.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 461.
92. Id.

The Court discussed police officers’ techniques of persuasion including

“depriv[ing] [the individual] of every psychological advantage” by isolating him in an unfamiliar, private setting, “display[ing] an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt,” focusing
on questions as to why the individual committed the particular crime to elicit details, showing some hostility when kindness and false understanding of the individual being interrogated fails, acquiring confession via “trickery” or other coercion, and generally subjecting
the individual to psychological pressure and tactics that cause him to make some kind of
confession to the law enforcement official. Id. at 449–57.
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may “guard against intimidation or trickery.” 93 With these policy concerns in mind, the Supreme Court attempted to balance the needs of
the police with the needs of those being questioned and determined
that: (1) police officers require a clear set of procedural guidelines
for when they must advise individuals of their rights, and (2) the
rights of those individuals being questioned need to be protected. 94
The Court continued on to establish clear guidelines for police
officers and courts to determine when statements during custodial interrogations have been appropriately acquired and may be admitted
into court. 95 Miranda established that law enforcement is only required to read an individual his Fifth Amendment rights if he is actually in custody; if not, then the law enforcement officer has no obligation to do so, and any voluntary statements obtained from the
individual may be admitted into court without issue. 96 For example,
in Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 the Court determined that an adult suspect
was never in custody when he went to the station at the request of the
police, was not arrested, and was permitted to leave after questioning. 98 An interview of this type does not warrant an issuance of Miranda warnings because, although it took place in the station house—
an inherently “coercive environment”—the individual being questioned was not in custody. 99 The Court commented that the types of
coercive environments that Miranda was designed for are those in
which “there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to
render him ‘in custody.’” 100 Although most interrogations and interviews with law enforcement take place in circumstances with coercive
elements because of the presence of the police officer and because
the individual being questioned may be charged with a crime, they do

93. Id. at 461.
94. Id. at 477–79. The Court noted, however, that officers may continue to “seek out
evidence in the field” by collecting preliminary statements, including voluntarily given
statements, and other general information. Id. at 477–78.
95. Id. at 478–79. The Court justified the creation of Miranda warnings based on a
need for “[p]rocedural safeguards” to protect the rights of individuals in custody. Id.
96. Id.
97. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
98. Id. at 495.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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not morph into Miranda situations unless the custody requirement exists. 101
The Court later elaborated on the concept of the coercive environment, what accompanies custodial questioning in such an environment, and when particular instances will trigger the requirements
outlined in Miranda. 102 The Court stated the “relevant inquiry” for incustody purposes “is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position
would have understood his situation.” 103 Adding to the in-custody discussion, the Court also determined that the subjective views of the individual being questioned or the views of the police officer performing the questioning are not relevant for Miranda purposes. 104 Rather,
the need for Miranda warnings depends upon the total objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 105 The Court commented
that an objective factor contributing to the Miranda analysis consists
of whether the individual has been taken into custody as described by
the Miranda rule; that is, whether the individual’s freedom has been
constrained in an overtly substantial way. 106 The test does not require
police officers to consider or anticipate “the frailties or idiosyncrasies
of every person whom they question.” 107 These later decisions directly
defined the Miranda test as being rooted in objective circumstances 108
and a reasonable person standard. 109
Shortly after Miranda, the Court decided In re Gault 110 and held
that the right against self-incrimination applied to juvenile and adult
offenders. 111 In Gault, the defendant was accused of making “[l]ewd
[p]hone [c]alls,” and, when questioned in a juvenile hearing, made
incriminating statements without being informed of his constitutional

101. Id.
102. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433–34 (1984) (holding that any person in
custody is entitled to the protections of Miranda regardless of the severity of the offense).
103. Id. at 442.
104. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 322–24. The Court offered this commentary via a discussion of background
cases that all commented on the custody aspect of Miranda. See id. at 323– 24 (discussing
past decisions on the in-custody test).
107. People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (N.Y. 1967).
108. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323.
109. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
110. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
111. Id. at 55.
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rights; he was then incarcerated in a juvenile detention center based
on the court’s determination of his status as a juvenile delinquent. 112
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court announced that admissions or confessions made by a juvenile at a delinquency hearing may not be used to commit him to a detention center
“in the absence of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission
was made with knowledge that he was not obliged to speak and would
not be penalized for remaining silent.” 113 Focusing mainly on the
right against self-incrimination, the Court commented that it would
be absurd if the rights protected by Miranda were afforded only to
adult criminals and not to juvenile offenders. 114 In conclusion, the
Court acknowledged that a child may waive the rights protected by
Miranda, but that an effective waiver may be less clear-cut when the
115
The Court must determine whether the
defendant is a juvenile.
waiver was legitimate or was forced while the individual was in custody. 116
B. Miranda Was Further Interpreted to Include a Two-Part Test That
Has Been Applied to Juveniles and Adults and Which Aids Courts
and Law Enforcement in Analyzing Whether an Individual Is in
Custody
Nearly three decades after the announcement that suspects must
be provided with Miranda warnings during an in-custody interrogation, the Supreme Court established a two-part test in Thompson v.
Keohane. 117 The test was meant to determine whether an individual
has in-custody status for Miranda purposes. The Court elaborated on
the guidelines for the in-custody analysis as follows: (1) under what

112. Id. at 4–8.
113. Id. at 44, 55. The Court also analyzed the purposes behind the right against selfincrimination with respect to both juveniles and adults and commented that the right is
based on the desire and need to ensure that admissions entered into court are “reasonably
trustworthy” and “not the mere fruits of fear or coercion” resulting from an interrogation
situation. Id. at 47. The right against self-incrimination focuses on such concerns because
it is essential for the purposes of justice that confessions are “reliable expressions of the
truth.” Id. Otherwise, the State may benefit from admissions not freely offered by the individual being questioned. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 55.
116. Id.
117. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
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circumstances did the interrogation occur; and (2) given those particular circumstances, “would a reasonable person have felt he” maintained the ability to end the interrogation and leave. 118 Along with
announcing this test, the Court also provided guidelines for its application. The Court stated that the first part of the test applied to the
specific facts of the surrounding circumstances, and the second part
of the test applied to the “controlling legal standard.” 119 In the second prong of the test, the Court determined that the question to ask
is whether an objective, reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe he was in custody as described by Miranda. 120
After the circumstances of the interrogation are analyzed and evaluated with respect to what a reasonable person would believe, the court
determines whether the interrogated individual was in custody for Miranda purposes. 121
Over the past decade, the Court has considered when a juvenile
is in custody under the test announced in Thompson. For example, in
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 122 the police called a seventeen-year-old suspected of murder and attempted robbery into the station house; he
was transported there voluntarily by his parents. 123 Once there, the
parents of the defendant waited in the lobby of the station for the duration of the two-hour interview. 124 The suspect was not read his Miranda rights. 125 The Court determined that the defendant was not in
custody for Miranda purposes because a reasonable person in similar
circumstances would have felt he was free to end the questioning and
leave the station. 126 The Court provided specific reasons as to why this
determination was correct: the police did not take Alvarado to the station or compel him to appear there at a specific time, the police did
not threaten him or his freedom of movement, the police did not

118. Id. at 112.
119. Id. When the Court discussed the “controlling legal standard,” it commented that
the test involved “a mixed question of law and fact,” thus the disputed issues should be
viewed as such when they are on appeal or being reviewed. Id. at 112–13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 113.
121. Id. at 112.
122. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
123. Id. at 656.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 664–65.
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place him under arrest, his parents waited at the station for the interview to conclude, he was free to return home at the conclusion of the
questioning, and the questioning officer’s demeanor and attitude remained sympathetic to the suspect’s situation. 127 While the Court
based its conclusion on these factors, it did offer the countervailing
facts that could have led it to reach the opposite conclusion. Those
countervailing facts included: Alvarado was interviewed at the police
station, an area commonly associated with in-custody proceedings, the
interview lasted approximately two hours, 128 the officer did not tell Alvarado he was free to leave at any time, and his parents asked if they
could be present for the interview but were not allowed. 129 Despite
the countervailing considerations, the Court ultimately determined
that the lower court had not erred in finding that Alvarado had not
been in custody for the purposes of Miranda. 130
The Court determined that the defendant’s age and inexperience did not need to be analyzed because of the objective nature of
the Miranda test, which does not compel police officers to account for
an individual’s psychological mindset, experiences, or age during an
interrogation. 131 Further, the Court commented that because of the
test’s objectivity, Miranda cases differ from those in which juveniles
are treated differently than adults. 132 The Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that if law enforcement had to treat juveniles differently,
the Miranda “inquiry” would become focused “too much on the suspect’s subjective state of mind and not enough on the ‘objective cir-

127. Id. To provide an example of the officer’s demeanor, the Court stated that the interviewer asked Alvarado, at least twice, if he needed a break. Id. at 664.
128. The Court noted that a two-hour-long this interview is not brief. Id. at 665.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 666–69.
132. Id. at 667. The Court did not name the specific cases where juveniles were treated
differently, but the Court was likely referring to cases in different legal contexts, such as
tort and contract law, where juveniles are sometimes evaluated under different standards
as a consequence of their age and experience. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 14 (1918) (“Unless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person’s
eighteenth birthday.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (“If the actor is a
child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that
of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.”).
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cumstances of the interrogation.’” 133 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor agreed with the majority’s conclusion but signaled the direction in which the Court would eventually head: “There
may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the ‘custody’
inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona.” 134
C. The Supreme Court Has Carved Out Separate, Categorical Rules for
Juveniles Through Independent Analysis of the Position of Juveniles in
the Context of the Death Penalty and Life in Prison Without Parole
and Has Applied this Reasoning to Cognitively Deficient Adult
Offenders
The Supreme Court initially established categorical rules for juveniles facing the death penalty and later applied the same reasoning
when it limited the imposition of the death penalty on adult offenders
with diminished mental capacity. 135 Later, recognizing the limited
mental capacity of juveniles and certain adults, the Court further restricted the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders and
also limited the possibility of a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide. 136
1. The Court’s Early Decisions Regarding Juveniles Were Applied to
Adult Offenders with Cognitive Deficiencies Due to Their
Similarities in Mental Capacity and Development
With its late 1980s decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 137 the Supreme Court established categorical rules for juveniles in the death
penalty context. 138 In Thompson, the Court held that juveniles under
the age of sixteen at the time of their committed offense may not be
sentenced to the death penalty. 139 In making this decision, the Court
referenced specific policy, social, and psychological reasons, including
the idea that capital punishment for juveniles does not further the
goals of the criminal justice system and that juveniles are less culpable
for the crimes they commit because they lack the same experience,
133. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)
(per curiam)).
134. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
135. See infra Part II.C.1.
136. See infra Part II.C.2.
137. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
138. Id. at 838.
139. Id.
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education, and intelligence as adults. 140 The Court declined to prohibit execution of individuals under the age of eighteen years, 141
thereby opening the possibility of future litigation in this area.
The Supreme Court applied the reasoning developed in the context of juvenile offenders to justify not imposing the death penalty on
cognitively deficient adults. 142 For example, the Supreme Court considered the case of Atkins v. Virginia, 143 which involved a “mentally retarded” adult offender sentenced to death. 144 In Atkins, the Court determined that sentencing mentally deficient individuals to death went
against the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment”
clause. 145 In making this decision, the Court applied reasoning similar to that of Thompson to adult offenders with cognitive disabilities. 146
Some of the cited factors included mentally deficient adults’ “diminished capacities to understand and process information,” their lessened ability “to control impulses,” and their incapacity to completely
understand the overall surroundings and circumstances of a specific
situation. 147 The Court also noted that such offenders do not have
the same moral culpability as adult offenders with normal cognitive

140. Id. at 836–38.
141. Id. at 838; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty
on individuals who committed crimes at sixteen or seventeen years of age does not violate
the Eighth Amendment’s provision against cruel and unusual punishment).
142. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (denoting mentally deficient adults
as a separate class of offenders that may not have the death penalty imposed upon them).
143. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
144. Id. at 308–09. The Court referred to both the American Association on Mental Retardation’s definition of mental retardation and the American Psychiatric Association’s
definition. Id. at 308 n.3. According to the Court, the American Association on Mental
Retardation defined mental retardation as “refer[ring] to substantial limitations in present
functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, selfdirection, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation
manifests before age 18.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court noted that the American Psychiatric Association’s definition of mental retardation is
“similar” to the American Association on Mental Retardation’s definition. Id.
145. Id. at 321.
146. Id. at 318.
147. Id.
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abilities. 148 Overall, the Court relied on social policy reasoning as well
as psychological data when rendering this decision. 149 The same information was later applied by the Court in criminal cases involving
juvenile offenders and certain types of punishments, including capital
punishment and life in prison without parole. 150
2.

Drawing on Previous Decisions, the Supreme Court Further
Limited the Ability of Any Juvenile Offender to Receive the Death
Penalty and also Limited the Possibility of Certain Juveniles
Receiving Life Without Parole

The Court again considered the issue of capital punishment with
respect to juveniles in Roper v. Simmons 151 when it held that the death
penalty may never be imposed on individuals under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense. 152 Relying on Atkins, and its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court reasoned that juveniles should
not face the death penalty because they lack the same maturity and
cognitive ability as most adults, they are more susceptible to outside
influences and peer pressure, and their personality and character are
not as developed as those of adults. 153 As a result of these factors, the
Court concluded that juvenile criminal offenders are not among the
worst offenders who merit the death penalty. 154 It also commented
that “[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.” 155 Further,
the Court noted other areas in which juveniles have been restricted as
a consequence of their age, commenting that “almost every State
prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries,
or marrying without parental consent.” 156 In Roper, the Court ulti-

148. Id. at 320.
149. Id. at 320–21.
150. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (prohibiting the imposition of life without parole on juvenile nonhomicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (forbidding the imposition of the death penalty on offenders under
the age of eighteen).
151. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
152. Id. at 578.
153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–70.
154. Id. at 570, 578.
155. Id. at 572–73.
156. Id. at 569.
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mately created a categorical rule for juveniles, concluding that eighteen is “the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” 157
The Supreme Court also established specific rules for juveniles
who receive life sentences without the possibility for parole. For example, in Graham v. Florida, 158 the Court held that a life sentence
without the possibility for parole may not be imposed on a juvenile
offender who has not committed a homicide. 159 The Court cited reasoning similar to that of Thompson and Roper, including a juvenile’s
lack of maturity, diminished responsibility, and susceptibility to outside influences. 160 It was further swayed by the amicus briefs submitted in support of the petitioner, which demonstrated that there are
“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” including differences in how behavior is controlled and in how the brain,
and therefore the individual, matures. 161 Again, like in Roper, the
Court acknowledged that it was creating a categorical rule, which,
while imperfect, offered a superior alternative to considering juveniles under the established adult standard. 162 In establishing this categorical rule, the Court noted that its decision allows juvenile offenders without a homicide conviction “a chance to demonstrate maturity
and reform” because they still maintain the potential to grow and
mentally develop. 163
The Court’s development of categorical rules for juveniles in
Roper and Graham signified a movement toward setting aside juveniles
as a discrete class within the criminal justice system. 164 In both cases,
reliance on the factors of age and experience motivated the Court’s
decision. 165 Paired with the Court’s method of evaluating in-custody
situations and Miranda, the Court’s decisions in Roper and Graham
point to the conclusion that the Court would revisit juvenile Miranda
rights at some point. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court
did just that. 166

157. Id. at 574.
158. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
159. Id. at 2034.
160. Id. at 2026.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2030–32.
163. Id. at 2032–33.
164. Id. at 2034; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
165. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
166. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a child’s
age informs the custody analysis with respect to the child’s Miranda
rights. 167 Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor began by noting
that when an individual—adult or otherwise—is in police custody, he
is subject to increased pressure as a result of the circumstances and
atmosphere of the interrogation. 168 These pressures may result in the
utterance of statements not made by free choice. 169 According to the
Court, the psychological and physical isolation of being in custody
creates an increased risk for juveniles specifically because of their
age. 170 Under Miranda, warnings must be given prior to custodial police interrogations to reduce the threat they pose to Fifth Amendment
protections against self-incrimination. 171 The Miranda inquiry focuses
on an objective evaluation of how the surrounding circumstances
would affect the beliefs of a reasonable person in the suspect’s position concerning “his or her freedom to leave.” 172 By not considering
factors such as the individual’s mindset, the majority pointed out that
police have clear guidance on when to administer Miranda warnings. 173
The Court did not agree with the State’s assertion that a child’s
age does not need to be considered in the custody analysis. 174 Indeed,
the Court commented that under some scenarios, a juvenile’s age
“‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave’” because in some
cases where a reasonable adult may feel free to leave, a reasonable
child would feel pressure to remain and continue answering questions. 175 The Court then discussed that children generally lack the
167. Id. at 2399.
168. Id. at 2401.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2402 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (per curiam)).
173. Id. The Court discussed how the objectivity of the test avoids burdening police
with the job of trying to figure out the idiosyncrasies of every individual whom they question and how those characteristics may affect that person’s state of mind as he is being
questioned. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2402–03 (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325).
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same responsibility, experience, and judgment skills as adults, therefore making them more prone to influence by external pressures. 176
Further, in other areas of law, such as in contract and tort law, children are not expected to maintain the same capacity as adults or to
exercise appropriate judgment and complete understanding of the
events occurring around them. 177
The Court then stated that “[s]o long as the child’s age was
known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been
objectively apparent to any reasonable officer,” including age as a factor in the custody analysis does not create issues with the objective
reasonable person standard so as to make it functionally inoperable. 178 In many instances involving juvenile suspects or offenders, the
analysis of whether they were in custody would make no sense without
some consideration of their age. 179 The Court continued that it
would not be appropriate to evaluate J.D.B.’s position from that “of a
reasonable person of average years” because J.D.B.’s age necessarily
affected how he viewed the circumstances of his interrogation. 180
Next, the Court rejected the State’s reasons as to why a juvenile’s
age should not be considered. 181 The Court rooted its reasoning primarily in an analysis of how a juvenile’s cognitive abilities, maturity,
and understanding differ from those of an adult. 182 Finally, the Court
reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and

176. Id. at 2403.
177. Id. at 2403–04.
178. Id. at 2404.
179. Id. at 2405.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2406.

The State argued: “age is a personal characteristic,” as opposed to a

circumstance external to the interrogation, and considering it results in the reasonable
person test becoming too individually subjective; “age is irrelevant” because it focuses too
closely on how a suspect may internalize a situation, and the in-custody test should not focus on the individual’s internalization of the interrogation but rather on how the interrogation would be viewed objectively; consideration of age will make it more difficult for the
police and courts to apply the “one-size-fits-all reasonable-person test;” and finally that excluding age from the in-custody analysis does not present a threat to juveniles’ constitutional due process rights because the due process test of voluntarily given statements accounts for age. Id. at 2406–08.
182. Id. at 2403–05.
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remanded the case for “proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 183
In dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas, decried the majority’s opinion as “fundamentally inconsistent” with the main justification for the Miranda
rule—that is, the need for a clear and easily applicable rule for all
cases. 184 Justice Alito’s dissent essentially followed the same lines of
reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina: Age should not be considered
because the Miranda rule and the objective reasonable person standard require courts to ignore personal, external, and individualized
characteristics. 185 He also commented that many individuals will differ from the “hypothetical reasonable person,” but that does not require a departure from the original test because these individuals
have other legal recourse in claiming their confession was coerced or
extracted involuntarily. 186 Specifically, Justice Alito disagreed with the
majority’s decision for three reasons: (1) many minors subjected to
police questioning are near the “age of majority” and therefore the
original Miranda rule would not be a “bad fit;” (2) the original Miranda in-custody rule is well-suited for juveniles because, although many
police interrogations of juveniles occur in a “school setting,” the rule
has always taken the setting into account; and (3) in cases “where the
suspect is especially young,” such as in J.D.B., courts can instead evaluate the “incriminating statements” made under the “constitutional
voluntariness standard” to ensure that they were not acquired by inappropriate means. 187
Justice Alito then discussed the history and purpose of Miranda,
stating that the Miranda rule was intended to dispose of the confusing
subjective “voluntariness” test that considered “[a]ll manner of individualized, personal characteristics” of the suspect, including education, mental health status, intelligence, and age.188 He recommended

183. Id. at 2408.
184. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
185. Compare id. at 2408–09, with In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795, 800-01 (N.C. Ct. App.
2009), aff’d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), and In re J.D.B., 686
S.E.2d 135, 139–40 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
186. J.B.D., 131 S. Ct. at 2409.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2410.

Justice Alito continued on to comment that after Miranda, the

“[p]ersonal characteristics of suspects have consistently been rejected or ignored as irrele-
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that rather than consider the age of an individual and risk muddling
the Miranda test, courts should focus on the voluntariness of juveniles’
statements; he believed that the “voluntariness inquiry” would adequately account for juvenile offenders “unique needs” as a consequence of being “mere children.” 189 Justice Alito concluded that the
“new, ‘reality’-based approach” adopted by the majority would eventually create a loss of the standard’s “clarity and ease of application.” 190
IV. ANALYSIS
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court extended the Miranda rule to include a consideration of age where juvenile offenders
are concerned. 191 The Court’s decision in J.D.B. relied on its previous
decisions that considered juveniles a separate class of individuals. 192
The rule announced in J.D.B. appropriately considers the cognitive
limitations of juveniles and allows courts and law enforcement officials to view juvenile offenders under the appropriate in-custody
standard. 193
Contrary to what the dissent in J.D.B. posited, the majority’s decision does not destroy the Miranda rule, or obscure the two-part test to
determine if an individual is in custody. 194 Rather, the rule announced in J.D.B. merely expands the test for one class of offenders:
juveniles. 195 The Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B. marks an appropriate, progressive move to further establish categorical rules for juvenile offenders because of their marked differences compared to average adult offenders. 196 The reasoning behind J.D.B. may be
appropriately applied to cognitively deficient adults due to the similarities that this class shares with juvenile offenders. 197

vant under a one-size-fits-all reasonable-person standard” and, as such, the test should not
be changed now to consider even the characteristic of age. Id. at 2411, 2418.
189. Id. at 2418.
190. Id.
191. See infra Part IV.A.
192. See infra Part IV.A.1.
193. See infra Part IV.A.2.
194. See infra Part IV.B.
195. See infra Part IV.B.
196. See infra Part IV.C.1
197. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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A. The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B Has Positively Changed the
Application of Miranda to Juveniles
In J.D.B., the Court appropriately formulated a test that accounts
for the differences between juvenile and adult offenders in custodial
situations and revived the historical arguments as to why juveniles
should be treated differently. 198 The Supreme Court’s decision in
J.D.B. to expand the Miranda test to account for age will better protect
the constitutional rights of juvenile offenders. 199
1. The Majority’s Modification of the Miranda Rule Signifies Not
Only a Reliance by the Court on Historical Arguments Concerning
the Differences Between Adults and Juveniles but also Depicts the
Evolving Manner in Which Juveniles Are Regarded in the
Criminal Justice System
In J.D.B., the Supreme Court expanded on the application of the
right against self-incrimination by adding age to the “reasonable person” analysis. 200 The Court recognized the need to evaluate the cognitive abilities of juveniles when it discussed how the specific context
and surroundings of an interrogation may affect a juvenile offender’s
belief that he may leave the interrogation when it compared the juvenile’s belief to an adult offender’s belief that he may depart from the
same situation. 201 The Court referenced Haley v. Ohio as an example
of a case that appropriately categorized the experiences of juveniles as
compared with adults. 202 That is, the Court in Haley was correct to
note that what “would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe
and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.” 203

198. See infra Part IV.A.1.
199. See infra Part IV.A.2.
200. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
201. Id. at 2403. The Court specifically discussed how the experiences of an adult may
inform the individual that an interrogation is occurring and he need not feel pressured by
the surrounding circumstances, whereas the experiences of a juvenile may result in the
child being overwhelmed by the pressures and formalities associated with the interrogation process. Id.
202. Id. at 2397; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
203. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599.
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Developmental evidence supports this assertion and suggests that
juveniles lack the same cognitive processing abilities as adults. 204 Specifically, juveniles may be less inhibited in their actions and words as a
consequence of a surge in neurological development through their
mid- and late-teenage years. 205 Paired with this decreased inhibition,
juveniles are “more prone to erratic behavior than adults” and process
situations that may be emotionally charged, such as an interrogation,
differently than adults would. 206
It is useful to evaluate the circumstances surrounding J.D.B.’s
questioning in light of Haley and specific cognitive evidence. J.D.B.’s
perception of the situation may be gathered from his specific statement to Officer DiCostanzo concerning “whether he would still be in
trouble” if he returned the stolen items and his confession when Officer DiCostanzo brought up the threat of being placed in a juvenile
detention center. 207 It is likely that any juvenile under the circumstances of an interrogation in a closed room, where he was being
urged by an adult in a position of authority to “do the right thing,”
would be influenced by the fear and pressure of the situation. 208 Such
fear and pressure may compel the juvenile to act on his first impulse

204. See Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCI. 596 (2004)
(discussing how the brain is still developing in the middle-to-late teenage years and the
differences between adult and juvenile brains and cognitive function).
205. Id. at 596–97. This development is characterized by what has been labeled as a reorganization and “pruning” of neurons that “shape[s] the brain’s neural connections for
adulthood” and results in a decrease of impulsivity as well as better integration of information from the surrounding environment. Id. This reorganization is signified throughout adolescence by an increase in development of white matter in the brain and a recession of gray matter. Id.
206. Id. at 599. Specifically, the amygdala, “a brain region that processes emotions,”
functions differently in juveniles than it does in adults. Id. Research indicates that juveniles process fear and other emotions differently than adults do because of their decreased
cognitive inhibition, which may contribute to different responses in environments where
strong emotions are present. Id.
207. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399–400 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. See Beckman, supra note 204, at 597 (elaborating via experiment on how the adolescent brain responds differently to outside stimuli than the adult brain does); Catherine
Sebastian et al., Development of the Self-Concept During Adolescence, 12 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
SCI. 441, 443 (2008) (discussing how when compared to adults, adolescents have an increased awareness of others’ perspectives, leading them to interpret social encounters differently).
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and confess, whether he committed a crime or not. 209 The possibility
of being “evaluated” by others in the room 210 may also increase pressure for the juvenile to do what he perceives to be the right thing under the circumstances and to state what he thinks the adults wish to
hear. The juvenile’s cognitive capacity may not allow him to stop the
questioning on his own because he feels as though he must answer
the questions posed by his interrogators in order to please them and
escape the situation. 211 These cognitive processes and the surrounding circumstances, therefore, make it reasonable to assume that a juvenile in a position similar to that of J.D.B. is unlikely to realize that
he may decline to answer any questions posed to him. Without considering age in regard to the individual’s in-custody status, a law enforcement officer may not realize that a juvenile would consider himself in custody and thus the officer may commit a mistake that would
render the juvenile’s statements inadmissible at trial. 212
2. The Supreme Court Correctly Expanded the Miranda Standard to
Include an Evaluation of Age, While the Dissent Failed to
Recognize That Such a Rule Does Not Completely Destroy the
Traditional Miranda Test
The Court correctly determined in J.D.B. that juveniles must be
evaluated differently than adults in interrogation situations because of
differences in mental capacity, judgment, and understanding. 213 The
circumstances when a juvenile has waived his Miranda rights must be
scrutinized differently because the cognitive abilities of juveniles are
different than those of adults, especially where outside pressures are

209. See Beckman, supra note 204, at 597 (“[T]eens’ impulse control is not on a par with
adults’.”); Sebastian et al., supra note 208, at 443 (noting that children are more selfconscious than adults).
210. See Sebastian et al., supra note 208, at 443 (discussing the “imaginary audience,” a
phenomenon in adolescents whereby they “believe that others are constantly observing
and evaluating them, even if this is not actually the case” (citation omitted)).
211. See id. at 444 (explaining the enhanced need among adolescents for positive social
feedback).
212. See id. at 2401 (explaining that, under the Miranda test, “if a suspect makes a statement during custodial interrogation, the burden is on the Government to show, as a prerequisit[e] to the statement's admissibility as evidence . . . that the defendant voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights [against self-incrimination]” (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
213. Id. at 2403–04.
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apparent. 214 The Supreme Court’s adoption of such a rule, and the
policy reasons behind it, comports with early cases in which the Court
encountered the issue of youthful offenders receiving, or not receiving, readings of their rights when being questioned. 215
Conversely, the dissent characterized the Supreme Court’s previous view on how to evaluate questioning of juveniles in custodial or
potentially custodial situations as problematic because it shifted the
in-custody test by considering individual, external characteristics. 216
The dissent described the proper Miranda test as a “one-size-fits-all
reasonable-person” test that must be adhered to regardless of any
characteristics of the offender or any surrounding circumstances. 217
Nevertheless, Justice Alito admitted that “many suspects who are under 18 will be more susceptible to police pressure than the average
adult.” 218 Findings from developmental studies support this assertion
as well. 219 Despite this acknowledgment, the dissent entered into a
misguided discussion of how much farther the Miranda test may be
expanded now that the majority has essentially opened the door to
considering subjective factors. 220 Regardless, the majority’s arguments
prevailed and, coupled with developmental research data, provide a
clear set of reasons as to why juveniles should be afforded a different
rule where Miranda rights are concerned. 221

214. See Sebastian et al., supra note 208, at 443 (noting that children are more selfconscious than adults); see also Brief of Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394
(2011) (No. 09-11121) (“[J]uveniles are uniquely susceptible to making unreliable statements during the pressure-cooker of police interrogation.”).
215. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Court’s historical treatment of juveniles for incustody purposes).
216. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting).
217. Id. Justice Alito’s dissent made no mention of how not accounting for age can cause
problems for law enforcement officials; instead, he discussed what he believed to be the
operational flaws associated with the new rule. See id. at 2418 (concluding the new formulation of the Miranda test for juveniles will result in a loss of the test’s straightforward and
easy application).
218. Id. at 2413.
219. Beckman, supra note 204, at 597 (analyzing why adults generally have better impulse control than juveniles).
220. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2413–15.
221. See id. at 2398–99 (majority opinion) (holding that “a child’s age properly informs
the Miranda custody analysis”); see also supra Part III (discussing the Court’s reasoning).
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B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B. Does Not Destroy the Ability of
Police Officers to Implement the Two-Part Test from Thompson to
Effectively Question Juveniles
The Court’s addition of age still comports with the two-part test
announced in Thompson v. Keohane for determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes. 222 The Court simply added
another factor for officers to consider during custodial interrogations;
it does not require officers to consider any subjective characteristics of
the individual. 223 After J.D.B., the proper application of the Thompson
test would require an officer to: (1) evaluate the circumstances of the
interrogation; 224 and, (2) given that set of circumstances, determine
whether a reasonable person of the same age as the juvenile would believe he could stop the interrogation and leave. 225
Under this test, a situation might arise where a juvenile would
not need to be Mirandized because, under the circumstances, even an
individual of his age would understand the situation and would not
feel compelled to remain present for questioning. 226 An analysis of

222. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); see also supra text accompanying
note 118 (describing the two-part test). Applying the second part of this test, the Court
noted that “[i]n some circumstances, a child’s age ‘would have affected how a reasonable
person’ in the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’” J.D.B., 131
S. Ct. at 2402–03 (citation omitted).
223. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404. The Court stated that the inclusion of age in “the custody
analysis requires officers neither to consider circumstances ‘unknowable’ to them, nor to
‘anticipat[e] the frailties or idiosyncrasies’ of the particular suspect whom they question.”
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
224. See id. at 2411 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Relevant factors . . . include[] . . . where the
questioning occurred, how long it lasted, what was said, any physical restraints placed on
the suspect’s movement, and whether the suspect was allowed to leave when the questioning was through.” (footnotes omitted)).
225. See id. at 2398–99 (majority opinion) (holding that “age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis”); note 118 and accompanying text (outlining Thompson’s two-part
test).
226. For example, imagine a circumstance where a police officer asked a child a question on the street and the child somehow incriminated himself. Add to this the fact that
the child was perhaps walking to the bus stop and the officer walked along with him for a
chat and the child got onto the bus and left. The child was never detained, never placed
anywhere without his consent and merely answered questions that the officer posed to
him. This may be a more feasible situation for an older youth (perhaps in his late teens)
than for a young child who may feel he must talk to the police officer or face punishment.
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one of the Court’s previous decisions, Yarborough v. Alvarado, depicts
how the revised Thompson standard would apply to an already decided
case. 227 The Court’s original decision in Alvarado informed courts
and law enforcement officials about when a juvenile may think he is
not in custody because he, or his legal guardians, voluntarily submitted to questioning. 228 Employing the revised Thompson standard in
these circumstances, it is evident that the juvenile did not use his own
capacity to submit to interrogation. The decision of the parents validated the questioning as appropriate, and the juvenile could view the
adult presence as an extra safeguard. 229 Under these circumstances,
the juvenile offender may not be found in custody because a reasonable person of the same age would feel he could stop the interrogation.
While Alvarado demonstrates how the revised Thompson standard
could be applied, J.D.B. elaborates on how this revised standard is
necessary to avoid absurd results. The circumstances in J.D.B. differed
from the circumstances in Alvarado for several reasons: J.D.B.’s guardians were not called into the school or at all; J.D.B. was questioned in
an official setting but was not taken to the station house; he did not
independently leave class when summoned to the office, rather the
school security guard accompanied him as an escort; and he was free
to leave at the end of the interrogation after he gave Officer DiCostanzo his statement. 230 Under these operative facts, the Supreme
Court asked, as it must under Miranda and Thompson, how the ideal
“reasonable person of average years” would understand such a situation if he occupied J.D.B.’s position. 231 Specifically, the Court queried,
how would a reasonable adult understand his situation, after
being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a
uniformed school resource officer; being encouraged by his
assistant principal to “do the right thing”; and being warned

227. Alvarado was decided under the original Thompson standard; it provides a good example of how the test was applied and how the revised Thompson test may be applied in a
similar situation.
228. Id. at 663–65.
229. See id. at 664–65 (describing how the presence of Alvarado’s parents in the lobby of
the police station weighed in favor of Alvarado being found not in custody).
230. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399–400.
231. Id. at 2405.
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by a police investigator of the prospect of juvenile detention
and separation from his guardian and primary caretaker? 232
The Court correctly recognized that J.D.B.’s situation would be “absurd[]” to an adult and therefore the test for juveniles must be altered
to account for these differences. 233
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B. Adhered to the Progressive
Trend of Establishing Categorical Rules for Juvenile Offenders and
May Be Applied to Another Class of Offenders
The Court’s alteration of the Miranda test in J.D.B. adds the factor of age for courts and law enforcement to consider, and requires a
focus on psychological developmental and cognitive data. 234 The
Court’s decision in J.D.B. indicates a continuing trend of recognizing
juveniles’ stage of development and of creating categorical rules for
juvenile offenders. 235 Further, based on the Court’s reasoning in
J.D.B., the test formulated by the Court could apply to another discrete category of offenders: cognitively deficient adults. 236
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B. Adhered to the Positive
Trend of Defining Juveniles as a Separate Class which Must Be
Considered Differently Under Existing Legal Principles in the
Criminal Justice System
As the Court articulated in J.D.B. and other decisions, juveniles
must be afforded differential treatment within the criminal justice system. 237 The decision in J.D.B. marks a positive milestone in juvenile
criminal justice policy: the recognition that juvenile offenders must be
viewed under a separate Miranda rule than the rule applied to
adults. 238 Such a rule allows the criminal justice system to operate on
a more individual level and account for the special position of juve-

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See supra Part IV.A.
235. See infra Part IV.C.1.
236. See infra Part IV.C.2.
237. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
238. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399; cf. id. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Miranda test is properly a one-size-fits-all analysis).
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nile offenders. 239 While some juveniles have vast experiences with the
criminal justice system, many others do not have those experiences,
and therefore they may not realize their rights in an interrogation situation. 240 Although the possibility exists that this new rule may cause
police officers to Mirandize individuals they normally would not, 241
consideration of age for custody purposes does not put undue burden
on police officers. Likely, many officers already make such judgment
calls concerning the age of individual juvenile offenders they are
about to question; such a determination informs the officers of
whether the child’s guardian needs to be contacted and how the interrogation should proceed. 242 Further, the rule benefits police officers because it encourages them to Mirandize individuals and ensures
that collected statements will not be summarily rejected for lack of following procedures. 243 Overall, the rule announced in J.D.B. has positive policy implications, providing juveniles with better protection of
their rights and furthering the Supreme Court’s trend of establishing
separate rules for juveniles. 244
The rule in J.D.B. reinforces the Roper and Graham rules that treat
juveniles differently. 245 All three of these rules were created through
the same lines of reasoning: Individuals under the age of eighteen do
not maintain the same cognitive processing capacity as adults and
therefore should not be treated in exactly the same way as adult of239. See Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass’n, and the Mo. Psychol. Ass’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 4–15, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (discussing juveniles as a
group and how their developmental position affects their ability to comprehend and understand their situation and involvement within the criminal justice system).
240. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402–08 (majority opinion).
241. See Robert Barnes, Child Suspects’ Age Crucial to Reading of Rights, Justices Rule, WASH.
POST, June 16, 2011, at A2 (reporting on the concern that the Court’s decision would
cause police officers to give more warnings than necessary).
242. See Brief of Juv. L. Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21–31,
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121) (describing existing requirements for police officers
to consider age).
243. See J.D.B. 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (acknowledging that the consideration of age erects a
barrier to the admission of a defendant’s incriminating statements at trial).
244. See id. at 2399 (protecting juveniles in interrogatory situations); Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (prohibiting the imposition of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005) (forbidding the imposition of the death penalty on offenders under the age of
eighteen).
245. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
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fenders. 246 Rather, based on the developmental differences between
juveniles and adults, juveniles should be afforded more protections
within the criminal justice system because they may fail to comprehend and react to certain situations in the same way as adults. 247 Developmental research also provides further insight as to why juveniles
should be treated differently than adult offenders in the criminal arena: Because of differences between the developing juvenile brain and
the adult brain, juveniles are more likely to engage in risky and impulsive behavior, the consequences of which they may not recognize
until well after the fact. 248 While such developmental differences
should not provide juveniles a “free-pass” to commit crime, it makes
sense to evaluate juvenile offenders under a different standard. The
creation of rules like those found in J.D.B., Roper, and Graham provide
very limited, yet appropriate, accommodations for juvenile offenders. 249 While these rules may seem more lenient or subjective for juveniles, they still hold them to a standard by which they may be
brought into court and punished for their crimes. 250 Ultimately, the
creation of these “categorical” rules provides law enforcement and
courts with better guidelines on how to appropriately evaluate juvenile offenders within the criminal justice system.
2. Although the Supreme Court’s Alteration of the Miranda Test Does
Not Open It to Many Additional Subjective Standards for Adult
Offenders, the Rule Announced in J.D.B. Could Apply to Adult
Offenders Suffering from Cognitive Disabilities
The change in the Miranda analysis with respect to juveniles does
not open the Miranda test to the addition of other elements with respect to normal adult offenders. 251 Moreover, it appears the Court
still intended for other procedural rules from adult cases to apply to

246. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404–05; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–
70.
247. Beckman, supra note 204, at 597.
248. Daniel Romer, Adolescent Risk Taking, Impulsivity, and Brain Development: Implications
for Prevention, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 263, 263–64 (2010).
249. See supra note 244.
250. None of the rules in J.D.B., Roper, or Graham seek to absolve juveniles from crimes;
they merely afford juveniles extra protection within the justice system by accounting for
their age. See supra note 244.
251. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (discussing the continuing objectivity of the Miranda test).
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juvenile offenders. 252 Thus, the addition of age merely informs the
Miranda analysis in juvenile cases. 253 The majority defended its position when it commented that “a child’s age differs from other personal characteristics that, even when known to police, have no objectively
discernible relationship to a reasonable person’s understanding of his
freedom of action.” 254 Like an adult offender, courts and law enforcement do not need to consider the juvenile’s prior experience
within the criminal justice system; they merely need to evaluate if, at
the time of the questioning, the child’s age was known or would have
been known under the circumstances to a “reasonable officer.” 255
The Court also stated that the new rule applies specifically to juveniles
and does not result in the wholesale destruction of the Miranda analysis imagined by the dissent. 256 The majority stated, in short, that the
rule announced in J.D.B. does not change the Miranda analysis for
adult offenders.
While the decision in J.D.B. comports with the Supreme Court’s
other decisions regarding juveniles and only adds a single factor to
the Miranda analysis, it is possible that cognitively deficient adults
257
In particular, the rule may be apcould invoke the rule in J.D.B.
plied to those individuals who have disorders that are characterized by
a lack of inhibition or inability to control impulsive behavior. 258 For
example, the following scenario may be imagined: An offender who

252. Id. at 2406 (discussing the newly formulated rule and how age may not be determinative in some cases). The Court further refuted the State’s and the dissent’s arguments by stating that the addition of age does not open the door for a further consideration of other subjective characteristics for Miranda purposes. Id. at 2406–08.
253. Id. at 2399.
254. Id. at 2404.
255. Id. at 2404–06.
256. Id. at 2406–07.
257. Such a scenario may be imagined in a case such as Atkins v. Virginia, where the
Court based its decision on evidence supporting decreased metal capacity of cognitively
deficient adults. 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002).
258. An expansion of the test announced by the majority in J.D.B. is imagined by Justice
Alito, who decried the majority’s decision as opening up the floodgates to a loss of “clarity
and ease of application” of the Miranda standard. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting). The majority of the Court did make reference to the mental capacities of juvenile offenders when compared to normal adult offenders; thus it is easy to draw similarities
between juvenile offenders and cognitively deficient adult offenders. Id. at 2403 (majority
opinion).
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has an IQ that would classify that individual as cognitively deficient259
commits an offense; to use the example from J.D.B., he commits a
burglary. His cognitive impairment causes him to have psychological
and intellectual abilities similar to that of a child, 260 and the individual
does not understand why he is called into his supervisor’s office at
work the next day (or asked to come to the police station of his own
accord). Like J.D.B., he is seated in a room with one or more police
officers, and maybe even other authority figures he is familiar with,
such as a supervisor or manager. Then he is asked a battery of questions in a closed setting. Feeling confused, pressured, and overwhelmed by the situation, the individual is coerced into confessing to
the crime without ever receiving any reading of his rights. 261 Similar
to J.D.B., this individual is charged with the confessed crime and must
appear before a court. At this point, the facts in this fictional case appear similar to those of J.D.B.’s except with regard to the alleged offender’s physical age. While the alleged offender is physically over
the age of eighteen, his mental state and cognitive understanding may
be compared to that of J.D.B.’s; that is, the alleged offender belongs
to a group that is characterized by being easily susceptible to suggestion and coercion. 262
After the hypothetical offender’s arrest, he meets with his attorney who, realizing his client’s plight, wishes to utilize the rule from
J.D.B. and exclude his client’s statements based on his lack of understanding of the situation when he made his confession. 263 At this
point, a judge would need to consider whether the rule in J.D.B.
should be extended to include “psychologically juvenile” adult of-

259. For a definition, see supra note 144.
260. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 20–21 (2010) (equating the cognitive abilities of mentally deficient
adult offenders with the cognitive abilities of juvenile offenders in interrogation situations); Michael J. O’Connell et al., Miranda Comprehension in Adults with Mental Retardation
and the Effects of Feedback Style on Suggestibility, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 359, 359–60 (2005) (discussing the limited abilities of cognitively deficient adults to fully understand their constitutional rights in an interrogation situation).
261. O’Connell et al., supra note 260, at 359–60.
262. Id. at 360–61.
263. See Kassin et al., supra note 260 at 8–9, 20–21 (discussing the inability of both cognitively deficient adults and juveniles to fully or even partially understand Miranda warnings and the situations in which they are administered).
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fenders. 264 Similarities may be drawn between the hypothetical offender and a juvenile offender in the same situation based on the
cognitive data and characteristics of juveniles cited by the Supreme
Court in J.D.B. 265 Indeed, reasoning applied to cognitively deficient
adults has often been applied to juveniles. 266 Under this reasoning, it
would follow that juvenile offenders and cognitively deficient adult
offenders fall into the same class: a class composed of individuals who,
although they may have different physical ages, have similar cognitive
ages and abilities and therefore should be afforded the same Miranda
protections under the law. 267 Without such protections, cognitively
impaired individuals often do not recognize their ability to invoke
their constitutional rights or may be pressured into making inappropriate or false confessions that are later used against them in court. 268
Extending the test formulated in J.D.B. to cognitively impaired adults
would provide an extra layer of protection to them, thereby affording
them justice within the criminal justice system. 269
Two potential issues arise when the rule from J.D.B. is applied to
adult offenders: (1) how will police officers know they are questioning
264. For support of this proposition, the judge would likely want to refer to the discussion of the cognitive abilities of juveniles in J.D.B. as well as secondary sources that support
comparisons between juvenile offenders and adults with cognitive deficiencies. See J.D.B.
v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403–04 (2011) (analyzing how a juvenile’s cognitive
capacity differs from that of an adult); see also supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
(providing an example of secondary sources that compare cognitively deficient adults to
juveniles).
265. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403–04 (providing characteristics of juveniles).
266. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (deciding that cognitively deficient adult offenders may not be sentenced to the death penalty), with Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 559–60, 578 (2005) (adopting Atkins’s reasoning and determining that the
death penalty may never be imposed on juveniles).
267. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 8–9, 20–21 (discussing the similarities between
juvenile offenders and adult offenders with cognitive disabilities in custodial, interrogatory
situations).
268. See, e.g., Robert Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons with Intellectual Disabilities:
The List Keeps Growing, 46 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 468 (2008) (offering
examples of fifty-three false confessions acquired from individuals with various cognitive
deficiencies while in custody).
269. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 30–31 (discussing two other methods for protection: (1) mandatory attorney presence during questioning, and (2) specialized training of
law enforcement officials and other individuals involved in the criminal justice system who
come into contact with cognitively deficient adults).
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a cognitively deficient adult, and (2) how will the application of the
J.D.B. rule affect the ability of police to acquire confessions from
guilty individuals and convicted criminals? While these two issues are
important to contemplate, appropriate remedial measures may be
taken to diminish the impact of J.D.B. in the interrogation of cognitively impaired adults. 270
With regard to the first issue, police departments maintain a
number of options to educate officers on how to identify adults with
potential cognitive or psychological deficiencies. 271 For example, police departments could ask each individual taken into custody to
complete a short intake sheet before questioning commences. 272 Although the possibility exists that such education may not always be
enough to allow officers to easily identify adults suffering from mental
disabilities, it would provide officers with the ability to discern whether an individual who appears cognitively “normal” is really operating
under a diminished capacity. 273 Opponents of the application of the
J.D.B. rule may view this measure as placing too much responsibility
on the officers performing the questioning; such education, however,
may decrease the skepticism that surrounds “voluntary” confessions,
however, and may result in more appropriate convictions and fewer
false confessions on the part of individuals who suffer from cognitive
deficiencies. 274 Further, specialized training for police officers would
afford them the opportunity to appropriately interrogate cognitively

270. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 25 (stating that there is renewed support for the
reform of the interrogation process and renewed interest in preventing false confessions).
271. See Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION
212, 218–19 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of educating law enforcement officers to
understand the characteristics of mental retardation); see also Information for Law Enforcement and Magistrates, THE ARC NORTH CAROLINA, http://www.arcnc.org/law-enforcementand-magistrates (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Training Materials] (providing a list
of resources that law enforcement agencies may use for identification training, including a
handout that lists common traits, attributes, and behaviors that individuals with cognitive
disabilities exhibit).
272. See Training Materials, supra note 271 (containing a handout with an intake sheet
attached that may be manipulated depending on department needs).
273. Id.
274. Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 9.
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impaired individuals and, as a result, it may curb the abuses of power
during the interrogation process. 275
With regard to the second factor, reform measures may be undertaken by the entire justice system to ensure that inappropriate
confessions are not acquired from cognitively deficient adults. 276
Such suggested reform measures include: mandatory taping of all
formal interrogations, 277 the presence of an attorney or guardian at all
interrogations, 278 a revamping of specific interrogation techniques
employed by law enforcement officials, 279 as well as other techniques
and measures. 280 While opponents of the application of the J.D.B.
rule to adults may not be completely placated by these measures and
may argue that they defeat the purposes of Miranda and unnecessarily
complicate the justice system, such innovations and developments are
necessary in order to protect all individuals who enter the system. 281
Further, such measures do not per se change the Miranda analysis but
instead add more safeguards and checks to the criminal justice sys275. See Everington & Fulero, supra note 271, at 212, 218–19 (emphasizing the need for
heightened scrutiny of confessions given by cognitively deficient adults); see also Kassin, et
al., supra note 260, at 12–13 (discussing the abuse of power by law enforcement officers
during interrogations).
276. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 25 (noting the “renewed calls for caution regarding confessions and the reform of interrogation practices”).
277. Id. at 25–27. In February 2011, the American Bar Association approved the Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act, which was created by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws. ABA House of Delegates
Resolution 109C, Report: Uniform Electronic Custodial Interrogations Act (2011). This Act purports to require the “electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation process by
law enforcement,” but also permits states to decide what types of crimes this Act applies to
and how the recording will be accomplished. Id. The goal of this Act is to decrease the
instance of false confessions and to improve the integrity of the criminal justice system as a
whole. Id.
278. Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 30.
279. Id. at 27–30.
280. Other techniques may include continuing or extra education and training for law
enforcement on how to address interrogation situations in which they may be questioning
a cognitively deficient adult. See supra text accompanying notes 271–273; see also Training
Materials, supra note 271.
281. See Everington & Fulero, supra note 271, at 212–13, 217–19 (describing the vulnerabilities of suspects with mental retardation and suggesting protections); Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 30–31 (describing two ways to protect vulnerable suspect populations during interrogations).
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tem, therefore enhancing the credibility of confession evidence. 282
Overall, such remedies provide guidelines and issues for law enforcement and courts to consider and aid law enforcement’s job of acquiring confessions and convicting criminals.283
V. CONCLUSION
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court expanded the Miranda in-custody test for juveniles to include a consideration of age. 284
The Court appropriately expanded the Miranda test by relying upon
the differences between adult and juvenile offenders and by referencing historical arguments that supported this expansion. 285 The rule
announced in J.D.B. neither destroys the Miranda test nor the two-step
Thompson test for in-custody determinations; rather, it merely expands
the rule for one class of offenders. 286 Overall, with J.D.B., the Court
continued to move in a forward direction by considering juveniles’
cognitive limitations and by establishing separate categories of rules
for juvenile offenders. 287 Finally, there are limited instances when the
rule in J.D.B. may be applied to another discrete class of offenders,
specifically cognitively deficient adults. 288

282. See Kassin et al., supra note 260, at 9 (discussing the skepticism of confession evidence).
283. See id. at 31 (arguing that more attention to the problem of false confessions, coupled with reform efforts, will better enable police to make accurate decisions).
284. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011)
285. See supra Part IV.A.
286. See supra Part IV.B.
287. See supra Part IV.C.1.
288. See supra Part IV.C.2.

